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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MATTHEW FENN HILTON, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 20040 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves three consolidated actions, 
including a class action, brought on behalf of investors in Grove 
Finance Company of Pleasant Grove, Utah, seeking to recover the 
full amount of their investment (plus interest) in Grove Finance 
at the time that institution became insolvent. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
iThe Third District Court of Salt Lake County, Honorable 
Timothy R. Hansonf District Judge, granted Respondents" Motion 
for Summary Judgment on the basis of governmental immunity. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek affirmance of the District Court's 
order granting summary judgment. 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
Respondents agree with some of the facts set forth in 
Appellants' Statement of Facts, but controvert others, and 
believe that some additional facts with citation to the record 
should be before the Court. 
A. ADDITIONAL FACTS 
1. Prior to 1969, Grove Finance was licensed as both a 
small loan business (under title 7, chapter 10 of the Utah Code 
as it was then written), and an industrial loan corporation 
without authority to issue thrift (title 7, chapter 8 as then 
written) (R. 771) . During that period, the Utah Department of 
Financial Institutions was aware of no problem in Grove Finance, 
either by Department inspections or from any other source (JLii.) . 
Appellants have not alleged any occurrence in this period as a 
basis for liability. 
2. In 1969, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, or 
U.C.C.C., was enacted in Utah as title 70B of the Utah Code; Utah 
Code Ann. 7-10-1, et seq., the Utah Small Loan Act, was repealed, 
and all small loan licenses were terminated (R. 771-2). Grove 
-2~ 
Finance surrendered its industrial loan license at that time, and 
was granted a license under the U.C.C.C., as were a number of 
others previously licensed as small loan businesses (R. 771-2, 
778-82; see also Utah Code Ann. 70B-9-102).* Grove Finance held 
no other license as a financial institution for the remainder of 
its existence (R. 771-2, 786). 
3. From the time of the enactment of the U.C.C.C., the 
policy of the Department of Financial Institutions was that the 
auditing requirements and policy of fairly close fiscal 
supervision which applied to banks and other institutions under 
Utah Code Ann. title 7, chapter 1, did not apply to supervised or 
regulated lenders licensed under title 70B. It was determined at 
that time that the reporting and examination requirements 
contained in title 70B, regarding disclosure of loan terms and 
maximum loan charges, were the only such requirements which 
applied to supervised lenders (R. 772). This policy was set by 
the Department's administration, was based upon the statutory 
language in titles 7 and 70B, and was in accordance with what the 
Department perceived to be the underlying purpose of the 
U.C.C.C, to foster more open entry and competition in the cash 
loan field (R. 772-3) . The Department administration concluded 
that it had no authority to audit supervised lenders for 
1
 The texts of statutes and rules cited are set forth in Appendix 
B, inlLa. 
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financial soundness (id.; Deposition of Mirvin D. Borthick, pp. 
115-16). 
4. This policy remained in effect during the remainder 
of the existence of Grove Finance (R. 772, 786), and was applied 
to all supervised and regulated lenders in the State of Utah (as 
of 1980, approximately fifty supervised lenders and lf800 
regulated lenders) (!£.). 
5. From 1969 to 1980, Grove Finance filed a composite 
annual report with the Department each year, as required by Utah 
Code Ann. 70B-3-505(2), and their loan records were examined each 
calendar year by the Department, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 70B-
3-506. No violation of the U.C.C.C. or any other law, or other 
improper dealings, were ever indicated (R. 389-90, 693-4, 696, 
773) . 
6* At some point, the Department received several 
telephone inquiries as to whether debentures being sold by Grove 
Finance were insured, and as to whether the caller could obtain a 
refund from Grove for a debenture. Upon checking with S. Hal 
Haycock, Grove's chief executive officer, the Department was 
assured that the problem arose from misstatements made by Grove 
salesmen, which would not be made again, and that any complainant 
would receive a full refund. The Department also determined that 
Grove salesmen were properly registered with the Utah Securities 
Commission to sell debentures at that time (R. 773-4). 
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7. In March, 1980, the Department received a complaint 
that Grove may be involved in a "check-kiting11 scheme (R. 375). 
Commissioner Mirvin D. Borthick assigned two examiners to visit 
Grove Finance to investigate the complaint (Id.) • 
8. The examiners found Grove Finance's record-keeping 
inadequate to determine a balance between liabilities and assets, 
particularly as to debentures which Grove Finance had sold. 
Because of this, Commissioner Borthick caused a cease-and-desist 
order to be issued on April 8, 1980, directing that no further 
debentures or similar obligations be sold by Grove until a 
satisfactory financial statement could be compiled. The terms of 
the order were agreed to by Grove's chief executive officer (R. 
787, 790) . 
9. The Department retained a certified public 
accountant and his firm to perform a complete audit of Grove 
Finance and, during approximately the next three-month period, 
monitored progress in the audit; an effort was made to explore 
any possible means of resolving Grove Finance's financial 
difficulties and of conserving whatever assets Grove had, so 
that, if possible, the Grove investors would be able to recover 
their investments (R. 787-8; Deposition of Howard D. Sherwood, 
pp. 7, 34, 42-3; Borthick deposition, pp. 108-9, 117-18). 
10. The accountant confirmed that the Grove records 
pertaining to supervised loans were generally in accordance with 
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accepted accounting principles (Sherwood deposition p. 39). 
However, apparently Grove Finance had sold a number of debenture 
bonds which it treated almost as deposit accounts, evidencing the 
debentures with either a bond or a document resembling a savings 
passbook, and allowing withdrawals and deposits in odd amounts at 
odd intervals (id., pp. 13-15; R. 867-95). 
11. In July of 1980, the Department determined with 
certainty that employees of Grove Finance were disobeying the 
cease-and-desist order and making inaccurate representations as 
to the nature of Grove's business (Sherwood deposition, pp. 29-
30; Borthick deposition, pp. 32-3, 103-4). Commissioner Borthick 
immediately had prepared a Stipulation for an Order granting 
possession of Grove Finance to the Department, which was signed 
by Mr. Haycock for Grove; pursuant to the Stipulation, Judge 
George Ballif of the Fourth District Court of Utah County entered 
an Order Granting Possession, authorizing the Department to take 
possession of the business and property of Grove Finance (R. 788, 
791-4) . 
12. In September, 1980, jurisdiction over Grove 
Finance was assumed by the United States Bankruptcy Court (R. 
788-9) . 
Respondents believe that the Procedural History set 
forth at p. 5 of Appellants' Brief is accurate. 
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B. AREAS OF APPELLANTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS CONTROVERTED BY 
RESPONDENTS 
Respondents controvert the following portions of 
Appellants1 Statement of Facts, for whatever significance these 
matters may have to the questions now before the Court: 
1. Appellants state at page 2 of their brief that 
Grove Finance "held itself out to the general public as accepting 
monies on deposit" from the early 1970's until its closure in 
1980. No reference cited gives any indication that the sale of 
debentures occurred for that period; the very earliest indication 
in the record of a debenture transaction is Junef 1977 (R. 875), 
and apparently all of the other debenture transactions in the 
record occurred from 1978 on (R. 867-95). 
2. Appellants also allege that, from the early 1970's 
on, Grove advertised through its agents and "in the mass media" 
that "deposits" in Grove were insured. No reference cited 
mentions any date when advertising is supposed to have occurred. 
The vague statements in the Hilton affidavit (R. 835) and the 
Sherwood deposition (p. 23), cited by Appellants do not disclose 
the place or manner of advertising alleged, and may be 
inadmissible as hearsay. On the other hand, Commissioner 
Borthick testified that the Department was not aware of any 
advertising done by Grove Finance (Borthick deposition, pp. 15-
16) . 
-7-
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT UNDER 
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT (UTAH CODE ANN. 63-30-1, ET 
SEQ.) . 
In Madsen v. Borthick. 658 P.2d 627 (Utah, 1983) , a 
very similar action where a group of investors in Grove Finance 
Company sued the State and Commissioner Borthick to recover the 
full amount of their investment, this Court ruled that 
governmental supervision of financial institutions is a 
"governmental function" to which provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act apply. The Court also held that Utah 
Code Ann. 63-30-4, a section of the Immunity Act, authorizes 
public employees to be joined in a representative capacity in 
suits against governmental entities only where the entity in 
question may be liable under the Immunity Act; "[i]n other words, 
the governmental official or employee can only be sued in a 
representative capacity when the governmental entity is liable." 
Id. at 633. 
In the instant action, Commissioner Borthick is named a 
defendant in his representative capacity, as Commissioner of the 
Department of Financial Institutions (R. 2), and it is evident 
that all allegations relating to him center on activities in his 
official capacity. Appellants do not claim that Commissioner 
Borthick acted with gross negligence, fraud, or malice (see 
Complaints at R. 190-200; Nelson, R. 1-7; DeRose. R. 2-17) . An 
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allegation that Commissioner Borthick engaged in any regulation 
of state financial institutions in his role as a private 
individual would be absurdf and Appellants make no such 
suggestion. Thus, the Madsen case indicates that the Court must 
look to the Immunity Act to determine whether or not the State 
may be sued in this action; and that, if the State is immune from 
suit, so is Commissioner Borthick. 
Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10(1) waives immunity for damages 
caused by the negligent acts or omissions of governmental 
employees, except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise 
or perform a discretionary function, 
whether or not the discretion is based, 
or . . . 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, 
suspension, or revocation of, ££ by the 
failure or refusal i£ issue, deny, 
suspend or revoke, any permit, license, 
certificate, approval, order, or similar 
authorization, or 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an 
inspection, or by reason of making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection of 
any property, or . . . 
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation 
by said employee whether or not such is 
negligent or intentional. . . . 
(emphasis added)• 
In light of the allegations made in the three 
complaints on file in this action, the District Court correctly 
concluded that Defendants are immune from suit on these specific 
statutory grounds. 
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A. DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION 
This Court, while eschewing any single litmus-paper 
test as to what constitutes a "discretionary function," has 
indicated generally that such a function is one where the act or 
decision in question requires "the exercise of basic policy 
evaluation, judgment, and expertise," Little v. Utah State 
Division of Family Services. 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah, 1983); 
Carroll v. State Road Commission. 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888, 
891 (1972), or where the immunity is necessary to shield 
governmental decisions impacting on large numbers of people in 
unforeseeable ways from legal actions, "the continual threat of 
which would make public administration all but impossible." 
Frank V, State, 613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah, 1980). 
Utah's Govermental Immunity Act was patterned after the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, Carroll v. State Road Commission, supra, 
496 P.2d at 890-891, and this Court has consistently applied a 
substantially identical standard as federal cases construing that 
Act, in determining the meaning of "discretionary function." 
Frank v, Stater supra, 613 p.2d at 519. 
Utah's exceptions to waiver of 
governmental immunity closely parallel 
those enumerated under 28 U.S.C., sec. 
2680(a) of the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
This Court has followed the lead of 
cases interpreting that act. Little v. 
Utah State Division of Family Services, 
£U£jLa, 667 P.2d at 51. 
Federal cases in which the issue has arisen have 
unanimously held that regulation of financial institutions is a 
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discretionary function under the Federal Tort Claims Act, for 
which regulatory agencies are immune from suit. 
For example, in Emch v. United States. 630 F.2d 523 
(7th Cir., 1980), cert, den., 450 U.S. 966, 101 S.Ct. 1482 
(1982) , shareholders in an insolvent bank and trust company which 
was taken over by the F.D.I.C. brought suit against the 
Comptroller of the Currency, the F.D.I.C, and the Federal 
Reserve Board. Very much as in the instant case, it was alleged 
that the defendants failed: 
. . . to properly and adequately 
supervise, examine and control the 
condition, performance, operation, 
liquidity and solvency of American City 
Bank . . . and . . . to take proper and 
adequate measures to correct 
deficiencies, . . . and . . . to take 
proper and adequate measures to preserve 
and conserve the assets of said bank 
. . . . I£. at 525. 
The Emoh complaint also alleged that the federal agencies had 
been negligent in permitting the issuance of misleading reports 
to the shareholders, in allowing fraudulent activities by the 
bank's officers to occur, and in committing "mistakes, errors, 
and omissions in the course of examining" the bank. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed a dismissal of the complaint, holding that such 
allegations "fall facially" within the "discretionary function" 
exception. Id. at 528. In determining whether a function is 
discretionary, the Court said, relevant considerations include 
whether the judgment exercised called for policy considerations 
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and was one which officials should be free to make without the 
fear of vexatious litigation. !£. at 527. The claims in JEmcJas 
. . . were an attempt to saddle the 
government with liability on the basis 
of its failure, in the course of its 
statutory regulatory activities, to 
anticipate the financial difficulties of 
American City Bank, to insure the 
honesty and competency of its officers, 
and to successfully prevent the losses 
to [the] stockholders which resulted 
from the bank's various difficulties. 
These are claims of the type which 
section 2680(a) was designed to preclude 
. . .- . I&. at 529 (emphasis added). 
in Pannhausen vt First National Bank of Sturgeon Bay* 538 F.supp. 
551 (E.D. Wis., 1982), the plaintiffs sued the Comptroller of the 
Currency and lower-level administrators under his supervision, 
for failure to enforce the National Banking Acts against a bank 
which had set off the plaintiffs' accounts against their 
obligations. Granting a motion to dismiss, the court cited the 
Emch case for this dispositive principle: 
. . . 28 U.S.C. 2680(a) [the 
discretionary function exception] 
precludes suits against agencies of the 
United States involved in the regulation 
and examination of banks based on 
failure of the federal agency either to 
supervise, examine, or control 
adequately and properly the condition, 
performance, or operation of a bank, or 
failure of the federal agency to take 
proper and adequate measures to correct 
deficiencies existing in the bank. JL&. 
at 561. 
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The court also held that a claim could not be stated for 
"withholding relevant information from the public" under the 
discretionary function exception, iii. at 562. 
The Federal Reserve Bank and Comptroller of the 
Currency were sued for failing to disclose the Franklin National 
Bank's insolvency soonerf extending credit to the Bank after 
learning of its difficulties, and allowing the Bank to remain 
open as long as it did, in Huntington Towers, Ltd. v. Franklin 
National Bank, 559 F.2d 863 (2d Cir., 1977), cert. d£jQ., 434 U.S. 
1012, 98 S.Ct. 726 (1978). Affirming a summary judgment for 
these defendants "for sound reasons of policy,M the Court of 
Appeals stressed that the acts alleged were the result of 
decisions which officials should be free to make without the 
threat of vexatious lawsuits or alleged personal liability. 559 
F.2d at 870. Other federal cases where summary judgment or 
dismissal was granted for federal agencies alleged to have been 
negligent in the regulation of financial institutions include 
First Savings $ LQan Association Vt First Federal Savings and 
Loan Association, 531 F.Supp. 251 (D. Haw., 1981), and 547 
F.Supp. 988 (D. Haw., 1982) (actions against F.S.L.I.C. 
dismissed); Davis v. F.D.I.C.. 369 F.Supp. 277 (D. Colo., 1974); 
Maoellsen v. F.D.I.C.. 341 F.Supp. 1031 (D. Mont., 1972). Each 
of these actions was summarily dismissed on the basis of the 
discretionary function exception in the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
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The United States Supreme Court's most recent analysis 
of the discretionary function exception, as it applies to 
regulatory inspection activities by governmental agencies, is 
particularly pertinent here. In United States v, Vayjg Airliner 
467 U.S. , 104 S.Ct. 2755 (1984), the Court held that suits 
could not be maintained against the Federal Aviation 
Administration for its negligent failure to detect hazardous 
conditions in airplanes which were in violation of federal air 
safety regulations, 4n the course of the agency's inspection 
prior to type certification of the airplanes.- The FAA's 
"spotcheck" program failed to find a non-fireproof trash 
receptacle in one aircraft, and a faulty gasoline line to a cabin 
heater in another, and both caused fatal in-flight fires. The 
Court of Appeals ruled, inter aliaf that the inspection of 
aircraft for compliance with safety regulations did not entail 
policymaking, and therefore was not a discretionary function. 
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court reversed. 
The Court found in the legislative history of the Federal Tort 
Claims Act an intention to exempt claims against government 
agencies growing out of their regulatory activities, 104 S.Ct. at 
2763. The Court reaffirmed its analysis in Dalehite v. United 
£fca££JB, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956 (1953), which held immune the 
decision to implement a post-war fertilizer export program, 
failure to determine the fertilizer's explosive capability, and 
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failure to police the storage and loading of the fertilizer 
before a dock-side explosion; the Court reiterated that 
"discretionary function": 
. . • includes more than the initiation 
of programs and activities. It also 
includes determinations made by 
executives or administrators in 
establishing plans, specifications or 
schedules of operations. Where there is 
room for policy judgment and decision 
there is discretion. 
73 S.Ct. 956, cited at 104 S.Ct. 2764. The Varig Court noted 
that the nature of the conduct, not the status of the actor, 
determines a discretionary function, and continued: 
. . . whatever else the discretionary 
function exception may include, it 
plainly was intended to encompass the 
discretionary acts of the Government 
acting in its role as a regulator of the 
conduct of private individuals. Time 
and again the legislative history refers 
to the acts of regulatory agencies as 
examples of those covered by the 
exception 
104 S.Ct. at 2765. The Court held that both the FAA's decision 
to adopt a spot-check program, and its application of the program 
to the particular airlines in question, were immune discretionary 
functions: 
Here, the FAA has determined that a 
program of "spot-checking" 
manufacturers' compliance with minimum 
safety standards best accommodates the 
goal of air transportation safety and 
the reality of finite agency resources. 
Judicial intervention in such 
decisionmaking through private tort 
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suits would require the courts to 
"second-guess" the political, social, 
and economic judgments of an agency 
exercising its regulatory function. It 
was precisely this sort of judicial 
intervention in policymaking that the 
discretionary function exception was 
designed to prevent. 
• • • 
In rendering the United States amenable 
to some suits in tort, Congress could 
not have intended to impose liability 
for the regulatory enforcement 
activities of the FAA challenged in this 
case. The FAA has a statutory duty to 
promote safety in air transportation, 
not to insure it. 
Id. at 2768, 2769 (emphasis by the Court). 
Similarly, the Utah Department of Financial 
Institutions may have a duty to promote investor security, but it 
has no duty or ability to insure it (point II, infx^). The 
Department's decisions as to the form its examinations will take, 
and the performance of those examinations at particular banks, 
closely resemble in this setting the FAA's adoption of a 
particular inspection program and the performance of inspections 
of individual airplanes. The Department's activities in this 
area clearly fall within the ambit of its role as a regulator of 
the acts of private individuals and entities, pursuing 
enforcement and inspection duties, and under both Dalehite and 
its explication in Varig. must be deemed discretionary. 
A non-federal case squarely on point here is Gormley v. 
fiiaifif 54 Ga.App. 843, 189 S.E. 288 (1936), where the State 
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Superintendent of Banks did not examine the savings and loan 
institution in which the plaintiff deposited her money, because 
(as in this case) he had concluded that the institution was not a 
bank which he was statutorily authorized to examine; the 
plaintiff lost her savings when the institution failed. The 
C o u r t f o u n d that t lit' S u p e r i n t e n d e n t ' s d e c i s i o n w a s a 
discretionary function, and dismissed the action. The case was 
found controlling in State v. Gormley, 57 Ga.App.. 714, 196 S.E. 
90, 9 J (1 9 3 8) i- w 1: ie r e a f oi:me i: i nv e s t o r i n t h e sam e i i :t s t i t u 11 on 
alleged that the Superintendent's "willful neglect to perform his 
legal duty" caused the loss of her investment. The action was 
summarily dismissed. 
This Court has not yet had occasion to rule on whether 
regulation of financial institutIons i s ai i i mmi ine discreti onai:y 
function. However, the most recent analysis of what constitutes 
such a function clearly indicates that this action may not be 
m a i n t a i n e d , !in iiiUlfe V, UJLflli. jSiaLfc J D A y i t l M i t-'i .Ejanuly S e r v i c e s , 
supre, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah, 1983), citing Evangelical United 
Brethren Church of Adna v. State, 407 P.2d 440, 445 (Wash., 
1965), the Coui t. looked to the? foJlowinq tactois In decidii lg 
whether a function is discretionary: 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, 
or decision necessarily involve a basic 
governmental policy, program, or 
objective? 
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or 
decision essential to the realization or 
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accomplishment of that policyr program, 
or objective as opposed to one which 
would not change the course or direction 
of the policy, program, or objective? 
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision 
require the exercise of basic policy 
evaluation, judgment, and expertise on 
the part of the governmental agency 
involved? 
(4) Does the government agency involved 
possess the requisite constitutional, 
statutory, or lawful authority and duty 
to do or make the challenged act, 
omission, or decision? 667 P.2d at 51. 
In the United Brethren case it was held that the application of 
variable security measures in making housing and work assignments 
to an incarcerated juvenile (who escaped and burned down 
plaintiffs' buildings) was a discretionary function. In weighing 
the four questions listed above, the Washington Court looked to 
the long history of statutory governmental regulation in the 
area; the furtherance of such regulatory policy by the function 
in question; and the nature of the state agency's statutory 
authority to perform the function. 
Applying these criteria to this case, it is clear that 
a discretionary function is involved. Regulation by the State of 
certain enumerated financial institutions has been mandated by 
statute since at least 1911 (see, e.g., legislative history of 
Utah Code Ann. 7-1-6 and -7). As financial conditions and 
institutions have changed, the statutory parameters of regulation 
have been adjusted accordingly to balance the competing public 
needs for fiscal safety, on the one hand, and free competition in 
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c e r t a 11 i f i n a i i c i a 3 a i: e a s,, c r i 11 :i € o t h e i: (s e e , e . g „, C o m m i s s i o n e i: s,: 
Comment on Utah Code Ann, 70B-3-503, and at 7 Uniform Laws 
Annotated, 242-3) .2 Both common sense, and the deposition 
t e s t Jiiioii^ a m i :\t i i riav il si o n l i l t , i n d i c a t e U u i ! the ik i c i m i ru"i t i o n 
of which financial institutions are subject to what kind of 
regulation is a decision essential to carrying out the State's 
regulatory po3 icy. Commissioner Brimhall (R 1 7 2-3) and 
Commissioner Borthick (R. 786) both attest that the Department's 
policy in thit aiea involve basic policy judgment and e v a l u a t i o n , 
I.e., a determination of what form of regulation both the 
language and purpose of the U.C.C.C. would permit for supervised 
lenders. 
The Department's conclusion that no authority existed 
for assuring t^p financial soundness of supervised lenders was 
e 11111 e I y c o a in a 11 e i: o f ] a w (t " o 1 1 1 1 1 1 •• A
 f b e I o w) . 
Nevertheless, even assuming arguendo that that determination was 
in error, it was still a discretionary act for which immunity is 
retained GQrptley yf Stater supra; state v. Gormleyr supra. 
Appellants seek to circumvent the clear application of 
the "discretionary £iinct i on" exception by arguing (1) that, in 
former title 7 of the Utah Code, the Legislature determined the 
kind and manner of supervision to which Grove Finance was 
2
 Excerpts from the Commissioners1 comments on the U.C.C.C. are 
set out in Appendix D r infra. 
-19-
subject, rendering such a determination non-discretionary 
(Appellants' Brief, points II-B, -C, and -E), and (2) that 
Respondents1 activities did not amount to high-level policy-
making decisions, and therefore were not discretionary functions 
(Appellants1 Brief, points II-A and -D). 
Of course, Appellants' first argument entirely begs the 
point that the title 7 examination scheme did not apply to Grove 
Finance, and that Utah Code Ann. 70B-3-506, the examination 
provision of the U.C.C.C., did not authorize auditing for 
financial soundness (see Point II-A, inixa)• It also ignores the 
solid case law, set out above, which holds that a decision as to 
what regulatory control is statutorily authorized for particular 
classes of institutions, even if erroneous, is discretionary, 
e.g., Gormley v, Stater supra; and that such regulation is 
precisely the kind of activity the "discretionary function" 
exception was intended to include, e.g., Emch v. United States, 
Appellants' citation of Fidelity Casualty Company of 
New York v. Brightman, 53 F.2d 161 (8th Cir., 1931), does not 
support their position. Aside from the fact that this Court 
should apply the criteria it has recently set out in the Little 
case as to discretionary function, rather than 1931 Missouri law, 
the Fidelity Casualty result favors a finding of immunity for 
Respondents. The Missouri Commissioner of Finance sought to 
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enjoin the prosecution of some sixty-one actions by depositors in 
a defunct bank, seeking recovery on the Commissioner's bond for 
his alleged negligence in permitting a bank to remain open after 
tie ,1 earned ot its financial plight, while he attempted to work 
with existing management to save the bank. After discussing 
Missouri statutes regarding the Commissioner's duty to determine 
ai id report inso] \ ei 1 cy,- the • Cour t of Appeals stated: 
It might be a mandatory duty of the 
Commissioner of Finance to settle the 
question of insolvency or danger to 
depositorsf but how the question should 
be determined is a matter of judgment 
and discretion. A mere erroneous 
conclusion uninfluenced by Felice or 
corruption cannot be the basis of an 
action for damages. 
• • • 
It is not for us to determine whether 
the state officials exercised poor 
judgment or to substitute our judgment 
for theirs. 53 F.2d at 168, 169 
(emphasis added) . 
In the instant action. Appellants similarly aver that 
Commissioner Borthick failed to enforce the cease-and-desist 
order (Appellants Briet, p. 25), Such is not the case (e.g., R. 
787-8), but even if it were, such activities are discretionary 
and immune from suit. 
Appellants1 argument also misperceives the nature of a 
statutory immunity. The point of an immunity is that it bars an 
action £X£jQ ,ii duty and otnei elements of a negligence claim can 
be set out. 
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The Fidelity Casualty case noted State ex rel. Funk v, 
lilXUfiXr 42 S.W.2d 594 (Mo., 1931) (also cited by Appellants) for 
the proposition that a duty to examine a financial institution 
annually may have been ministerial, but decisions as to the 
length, character, and extent of the examinations were 
discretionary. The Turner case found that, where a bank examiner 
failed to discover a large embezzlement during an examination, 
the State was immune from suit. Thus, any claim Appellants have, 
based on any purported inadequacy of the annual U.C.C.C. 
examinations which were performed is similarly barred. 
Appellants' second contention—that discretionary 
immunity only applies to policy-making functions—is similarly 
ill-taken. As discussed supraP this Court has not applied any 
single, mechanical test in this area, without properly weighing 
the pertinent statutory setting and aims; the policy evaluation, 
judgment, and expertise necessarily involved in performing the 
function in question;; and the practical need of shielding far-
reaching governmental decisions from the threat of continual 
litigation, Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services 
supra, Frank v> State/ £U£i£. 
Appellants aver that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
was patterned after California's immunity statutes, and reason 
from this that the result in this case should be the same as that 
reached in two cases decided under California's "discretionary 
-22-
function" statute. It is true, as Appellants suggest, that the 
C a ,1 i i o r n I a I a w J- w i- • i v m /»111 () r. e el <j e n e r a'! '* I € b a t e w h e n t h t ] 4 6c; 
Utah Legislature considered Senate Bil vhich became the 
Governmental Immunity Act. Howeverf the only reference to 
California statutes was that the proposed Utah bill employed the 
same general approach as California, preserving immunity with 
specif ical ly enamei at ed except ions; * then is pimply no 
indication at all in the debates that Utah Code Ann. 
63-30-10(1)(a) was patterned after the differently worded 
C a 1 i f o r n i a s t. a t u t e . ft,,1 s o, t. h e C a 1 i f o 1111., t c a s e f. e 11. e <i by 
Appellants were decided after passage ot the Utah Act, so there 
can be no pretense of a legislative intent to adopt their 
holdings. 
Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the California 
case 1 aw is of probative assistance, that state's appellate 
courts have properly refused to apply a purely mechanical 
semantic analysis regarding discretionary function, looking 
instead l\n whether the act requ i red "persona I del iberation, 
decision, and judgment." Thompson v. Alameda County, 27 Cal.3d 
741, 614 P.2d 728, 731 (1980). Far from applying the blanket 
test I hat disci et mndi y immunitv "only appi iff,, to ba> n 
policymaking decisions" (Appellants' Brief, p. 19), the 
3
 Excerpts from the legislative debate referring to the 
California statutes are set out in Appendix CF infra. 
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California courts have recently ruled that discretionary 
functions include, e.g., an improper selection of a mental health 
facility for an adjudged incompetent, Foy v. Greenblott. 141 
Cal.App.3d 1, 190 Cal.Rptr. 84 (1983); a Highway Patrol officer's 
decision not to investigate a stranded automobile, Bonds v. 
State. 138 Cal.App.3d 314, 187 Cal.Rptr. 792 (1982); an officer's 
request that parties in a dispute with a landowner leave the 
property, Watts v. Sacramento County. 136 Cal.App.3d 232, 186 
Cal.Rptr. 154 (1982)1 the appointment of a delinquent's mother as 
his custodian, where the delinquent subsequently committed a 
murder, Thompson v. Alameda County, supra; the determination of 
the lowest responsible bidder to a public contract, Pacific 
Architects Collaborative v. Stater loo cai.App.3d n o , 166 
Cal.Rptr. 184 (1980); and a decision not to have lifeguards 
patrol a particular dangerous stretch of beach, Fuller v. State. 
51 Cal.App.3d 926, 125 Cal.Rptr. 586 (1975). None of these cases 
involved high-level policy-making, yet each activity was 
discretionary. 
If Appellants in the instant action are held to have 
stated a cause of action, it is clear that every investor in any 
financial institution of any kind which fails (whether due to the 
stupidity or dishonesty of its officials, recessionary economic 
times, or whatever the cause) may henceforth bring suit against 
the State and the Commissioner of Financial Institutions to 
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recover I he lull .-liiiount of tin investment.. "T'lit Inescapable fact 
to be faced in this case is thatf in regulating financial 
institutions throughout the state, the Commissioner must be free 
cal decisions based upon his 
informed judgment and expertise, decisions often likely to raise 
the ire of one group or another, whether management 01 
shareholders UL depositors or others; in determining when and 
whether to take possession of an institution, the Commissioner 
must exercise his sound discreti 0:1 1 i n weigi :ii ng whether abrupt 
closure or continued efforts at possible recovery will best serve 
the public and the investors; and to subject the State and the 
Commissi one t t* u put en t i a 1 1 i ab i 1 i t.y whe nev v t a par ty 01 sagr ees 
with such a decision would effectively cripple all regulatory 
efforts in this area. 
The Com: t in,, re Franklin National Bank Securities 
Litigation, 478 F.Supp. 210, 222 (E.D.N.Y., 1979), made the 
following cogent observations as to thr wisdom of applying 
immunity in thp *rp* nf financial regulation: 
Officials of administrative agencies 
possess resources and expertise 
unavailable to courts. Their policy 
decisions rest upon delicate technical 
and political judgments of the risks and 
benefits of possible courses of action. 
It is highly unlikely that damage 
actiopg brought in the courts will 
consistently produce a more desirable 
balancing of the competing policy 
considerations [citations omitted] 
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Moreoverf allowing such review of 
agency policy decisions in the guise of 
damage actions would disrupt the 
intricate balance of power among the 
branches of government that the 
constitution requires; it would unduly 
elevate the courts. See Raichle v. 
Federal Reserve Bank, 34 F.2d 910, 915 
(2d Cir. 1929) ("The remedy sought would 
make the courts, rather than the Federal 
Reserve Board, the supervisors of the 
Federal System, and would invoke a cure 
worse than the malady."). The extent 
that agency officials have inadequately 
exercised their discretion, or have 
inequitably balanced the risks of agency 
action, presents a political problem to 
be solved by legislation or changes in 
agency personnel, and not a judicial 
problem to be solved by the imposition 
of tort liability. [Citation omitted.] 
(emphasis added.) 
Finally, it is obvious as a matter of sound legal 
analysis and of ordinary common sense that, in providing for 
regulation of Utah's financial institutions, the Legislature did 
not intend to establish the State as an insurer or guarantor for 
every dollar invested in every financial institution. Yet that 
would be the ineluctable result if Appellants were to succeed in 
this "attempt to saddle the government with liability" on the 
basis of its financial regulatory activities, Emch v- United 
States, supra
 r 630 F.2d at 529. The Emcll court approvingly cited 
the following from Zabala CI entente v. United States. 567 F.2d 
1140, 1151 (1st Cir., 1977), regarding claimed liability under 
OSHA laws: 
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We do not believe that the expanded role 
of the federal government in the safety 
area through such legislation as OSHA 
indicates an intent of Congress to make 
the United States a joint insurer of all 
activity subject to inspection. . . Nor 
do we believe that there is any sound 
policy basis for requiring that 
government attempts to protect the 
public must be accompanied by per se 
tort liability if they are 
unsuccessfully carried out. Cited 630 
F.2d at 527, n. 4. 
li i this case, the substance of Appellants 1 allegations 
is that Respondents erred in determining the authority for and 
manner of examination of Grove Finance, ai id erred ii I tl :ie ways i n 
which they enforced the cease-and-desist order after Grove's 
financial irregularities were discovered. When such allegations 
a r e e x am I n e d i n J i g h t c f t h e c r i t e r i a a ppl i e d by t h i s C o u n t a i I d 
federal courts for discretionary immunity, the pertinent 
statutes, and public policy considerations, immunity clearly 
applies, The PisLi uM: Court's granting of summary judgment on 
this ground was proper, and should be affirmed. 
B. ISSUANCE OR REVOCATION OP LICENSE; ISSUANCE. QE QiiDLI: 
In paragraph 11 of DeRose v. state, one of the three 
actions consolidated here, it is alleged that the State 
negligently issued a license as a requlat*:,d lender tc: • Grove 
Finance, absent adequate investigation (peRose. R, 5 ) . IiI 
paragraph 15, Appellants claim that the State failed in its duty 
to revoke Grove" F licenn- dti.l. hvvn if tint, these allegations 
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would not support a cause of action against the State. Under 
Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10(1)(c), immunity is specifically preserved 
for injury arising both from the issuance of a license, and by 
the failure to deny or revoke a license. The broad statutory 
language on its face preserves immunity generally in the area of 
governmental licensing, dependent as that function is upon the 
exercise of informed discretion and judgment by the licensing 
authority. Insofar as the alternative cause of action in the 
DeRose Complaint, or any other allegation in this matter, seeks 
recovery for issuance of a license or failure to revoke a 
license, such portion of the suit must be dismissed under 
63-30-10(1)(c). 
Appellants also allege that Respondents "totally failed 
to enforce the cease and desist order" (Appellants' Brief, p. 
25). The factual fallacy of this position (R. 787-8; Borthick 
deposition, pp. 30-34) and applicability of discretionary 
immunity are discussed in the preceding sub-point. Appellants' 
citation of Seymour National Bank v. State, 384 N.E.2d 1177 (Ind. 
App., 1979), as applying to this point is somewhat puzzling; 
Seymour was a wrongful death action for the negligent or willful 
misconduct of a state trooper in participating in a high-speed 
chase, so its pertinence to this case is not clear. The opinion 
of the Indiana Court of Appeals was subsequently vacated in 
Seymour National Bank v. State, 422 N.E.2d 1223 (Ind., 1981), 
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appeal dismissed, 4 57 11, t: 1 I 27 , 1 02 S. Ct 2 9S.1 (1982")
 r on the 
basis of Indiana's statute preserving immunity for the 
enforcement of laws. 
Appellants.'1' claim clearly " a i i s e s out, of the i s s u a n c e , 
» of , , lam] o r d e r , " arid is thus b a r r e d u n d e r U t a h C o d e Ann* 
63-30-10(1)(c). Again, the statutory language presetving 
immuni ty from claims ari sing from the issuance of "any . , 
approval
 f order, or similar authorization" is broad, and the 
policy underlying this pi:ovIsion seems to be 11" ,.at pu 1: • Jl i c entities 
will not be subjected to liability or cast in the role of 
guarantors of safety in all areas where they are charged with 
super \; i s I ng r e s po n s i b 1 1 i t i e s £ o r ] i c e n s I ng o r o r d e r i n g e i th e r 
action or a restriction of activities by private parties. 
Moreover, to whatever extent Appellants may base their 
act. inn on an <-il legal ion that Commissioner Borthick pursued the 
order granting possession either too early or too late, the claim 
would also be barred by Utah Code Ann, b.3- 50-lCMe), preserving 
immunity where injury: 
« , arises out of the institution or 
prosecution of any judicial or 
administrative proceeding, even if 
malicious or without probable cause. . . 
C. INADEQUATE QR NEGLIGENT INSPECTION 
Perhaps the gravamen of Appellants1 Complaints in these 
actions is that the State failed to inspect, or inadequately or 
n e g 1 i g e n t ] j i n s p e c t e d, t 1: i e i: e c o r d s o f G i: o v € • F i n a n c e e i t h e r under 
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title 7 (e.g., R. 3-6) or under title 70B (e.g., R. 7) Utah Code 
Ann. 63-30-10(1)(d) specifically preserves the State's immunity 
from suit for failure to make an inspection, or for making an 
inadequate inspection, and Plaintiffs' action must also be 
dismissed on this ground. 
This Court was confronted with an analogous situation 
in White v. State, 579 P.2d 921 (Utah, 1978), where a plaintiff 
who was injured by the machinery in a vegetable cannery alleged 
that the State, by inspection, should have been aware of 
violations of the Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act at the 
cannery. A far stronger case for recovery was present in white 
than in the instant matter, because Utah Code Ann. 35-9-13(d) 
provides that one who is injured by failure of the Industrial 
Commission to seek relief for OSHA violations may bring an action 
for appropriate relief. The Court stated that the OSHA statute 
was not a waiver of governmental immunity and, relying upon Utah 
Code Ann. 63-30-10(1) (a) (discretionary function) and (d) 
(failure to make an inspection), held that the State was immune 
from suit. As to the sound public policy basis for immunity in 
this instance, the Court stated: 
The legislature, in setting up the 
Occupational Safety and Health Division 
in 1973, had no intention of making it 
the scapegoat for every industrial 
accident. I&. at 924. 
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In the instant action, of course, Appellants have cited no 
statutes (because there are none) waiving the state's immunity or 
giving disappointed investors a cause of action against the State 
or its officers. As in the OSHA area, the Legislature has set up 
certain limited, well-delineated i:egi :i] atory cont ro 1 s • ::>vei: 
financial institutions, but has not undertaken to act as a 
guarantor of the safety of all financial activities, nor intended 
111 rod k tj l 11 ( SI d t i • 1 i a b I €• £ o!" a J J 1 o s s e h w h ,i c 11 c > v c u r 11" i e g u 1 a t o r y 
efforts do not create a world of perfect fiscal safety for 
investors. 
Appe 1 1 ai 11 s ag a i i: I see k t o av oI d th i s conc 1 u s i on by 
claiming that the Utah Immunity Act was patterned after 
California's law, and therefore, the scope of Utah Code Ami. 
I .*- v. • . • . c^ i s ] imited by the language oi the California 
statute. 4 (Appellants' Brief, point III.) Of course, just the 
contra r y 11 11 ue ; i h» " n u (« Leg a slatur e * s 1 -i i ] ui c t o adopt t he-
additional, limiting language present in the California section 
must be taken to indicate an intention to make the scope ci the 
Ut a h st a I. u t e 11> coadc;-1 , e xtend i nq i inmun i t y i * > 11 > t, M inspection of 
any property. u 
Nor can the two sentences of Senate debate, cited by 
Appellants (their Bri easonably applied as 
4
 Compare Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10(1)(d) with California 
Government Code 818.6, in Appendix B. 
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limiting the application of Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10(1)(d) to the 
two casually mentioned examples (plumbing and furnace 
inspections). Were that the case, substantially different 
results would have obtained in Velasgueg v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Company, 24 Utah 2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970) (State immune 
from suit for failure to inspect railroad crossing and direct 
installation of active warning devices) and White v. State, supra 
(State immune for failure to performed adequate OSHA inspection), 
both cited by Appellants. 
Instead, both the broad statutory language and prior 
precedent suggest an intent that government should not be 
subjected to liability for its regulatory enforcement activities 
in inspecting the property of private individuals and entities 
for compliance with applicable statutes and regulations—even 
when such inspections are less than perfect and failed to detect 
particular non-compliance. Implicit here are the same policy 
considerations relied on by the Supreme Court in United state vs. 
varig Airlines, supra, 467 u.s. , 104 s.ct. 2755, 2765 (1984): 
subjecting such regulatory activities to second-guessing though 
tort actions would seriously impair the ability of execute 
agencies to efficiently function in these areas. Like the Varig 
plaintiffs. Appellants base their action on an alleged failure to 
inspect; immunity is preserved by Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10(1)(d). 
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TV NEGLIGENT OR INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION 
In paragraph 30 of the Hilton Amended Complaint 
ref en i i!it.| to the cease-and-desist order issued by Commissioner 
Borthick, Appellants state that they Mhad no indication from the 
State . that such an oraei w ** . • ,» 
Nelson Complaint, Count Two, P - Appellants also allege 
(e.g., Hilton Amended Complaint, paragraph 16, R. 194) that if 
R e s p o n d e n t s lhad proper ".1 y p e r f o r m e d thei i: duti e s , A p p e l l a n t b w o u l d 
not havt invested their funds in Grove Finance, Ifr ; ; these 
allegations. Appellants wish to include iiI their cause of action 
ii claim that somehow thei i: .1 osses resulted from, the fact that 
they were not informed earlier of Grove Finance's financial 
condition, Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10(1)(f) al so I >a rs thi s action. 
That bection preserves immunity for a] 1 misrepresentations, 
whether negligent or intentional. 
On ce again n s o 1 i d 1 it n e o f i e d e n a 1 <. • a s e s, c o n s 11 u ,i 11 y 
the misrepresentation exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 
28 U.S.C. 2680(h), have barred claims arising out of banking and 
securities regulation b) tinier a 1 agencies* In First State Bank 
of Hudson County vr. United States, 473 p.supp. 33 (D.N.J., 
1978), affirmed on other grounds, 599 F.2d 558 (3d cir., 1979), 
HSJLl d&Ji..- "144 li.i, J D M , 10(1 iS-Ct:. 8 6 2 1 1 9 8 0 ) , t h e p l a i n t i f f 
based its action in part on the failure of the F.D.I.C. to notify 
the Bank's board of directors of irregularities discovered in a 
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bank examination. The district court found that this amounted to 
a claim of implied misrepresentation an allegation that the 
board was misled by the F.D.I.C.'s failure to take any of the 
statutory enforcement steps it had authority to take. Such a 
claim was held barred by the misrepresentation exception in the 
Federal Tort Claims Act. Other cases with the same result, where 
an intentional misrepresentation was alleged, include First 
Savings & Loan Association v. First Federal Savings & Loan 
Association. 531 F.Supp. 251, 255 (D. Haw., 1981) (barred action 
for damages against F.S.L.I.C. for allegedly joining in 
conspiracy to place plaintiff in receivership); and United States 
Vt SheehfrP Properties, In?*, 285 F.Supp. 608 (D. Minn., 1968) 
(barred counterclaim against United States Agency for 
International Development for failure to inform the defendant of 
facts concerning two corporations which allegedly would cause the 
defendant not to invest in the corporation). 
Thus, even if Appellants could prove that they were 
misled by Respondents' failure to inform them earlier of problems 
at Grove Finance, this would simply amount to a claim of implied 
misrepresentation. Particularly in light of this Court's 
reliance on federal case law construing parallel provisions of 
the Federal Tort Claims Act, Little v. Utah State Division of 
Family Servicesf supra, this action must also be deemed barred by 
the misrepresentation provision of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. 
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II. RESPONDENTS HAD NO DUTY TOWARD INVESTORS 
IN GROVE FINANCE COMPANY UPON WHICH TORT 
LIABILITY MAY BE BASED. 
It is a rudimentary principle of tort law that a 
prerequisite for liability in negligence is the existence of a 
duty of care running from the alleged tortfeasor to the injured 
plaintiff. Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th ed.f p. 143. Duty is Ma 
question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the 
benefit of the particular plaintiff," and no liability may be 
founded "upon the breach of a duty owed only to some person other 
than the plaintiff. . . . 'Negligence in the air, so to speak, 
will not do."' !£., p. 206; see Gray v. Scott. 565 P.2d 76, 78 
(Utah, 1977), citing Restatement of Torts (Second), Section 
328(b). The existence of a duty "is entirely a question of law . 
. . and it must be determined only by the court," and if no duty 
is found to be present, the defendant is entitled to a judgment 
in his favor, Prosser, supra, p. 206. 
Respondents submit that they had no statutory authority 
or duty to examine Grove Finance each year for financial 
soundness, as Appellants claim; and even if such authority 
existed, it would not give rise to a duty of care to Appellants 
upon which tort liability could be based. Respondents are also 
entitled to judgment on this basis, even if the District Court's 
ruling were not sustained on immunity grounds. It is well 
settled that a trial court's judgment may be affirmed on 
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different grounds from those relied upon below wheref as here, 
the other grounds were presented to the trial court, do not 
involve disputed facts, and have been fully briefed on appeal 
(Appellants' Brief, point I). Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar 
Hills Development Company, 614 P.2d 155, 157 (Utah, 1980). A 
judgment will be affirmed on proper legal grounds, even if such 
grounds were not relied upon by the district court, Branch v. 
Western Petroleum, Inc.. 657 P.2d 267 (Utah, 1982), Matter pf 
Estate of Hock. 655 P.2d 1111 (Utah, 1982), and this principle 
fully applies to appellate review of summary judgments, Allphin 
Realty. Inc. v. Sine. 595 P.2d 860 (Utah, 1979), Goodsel v. 
Department of Business RegvaatipPr 523 p.2d 1230 (Utah, 1974). 
A. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK 
Appellants argue that Grove Finance was somehow a 
supervised financial organization under title 7 of the Utah Code, 
whose financial soundness the State had a statutory duty to 
insure; and that based upon Utah Code Ann. 7-1-7 as then written, 
the alleged failure to fulfill this duty provides a basis for 
liability (Appellants' Brief, p. 7; Hilton Amended Complaint, 
First and Second Causes of Action, R. 191-5; DeRose Complaint, 
paragraphs 6-10, R. 3-4; Nelson Complaint, Count One, R. 4). A 
brief review of the statutory scheme which applied to Grove 
Finance is necessary in order to appreciate the fallacy of these 
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contentions. 
Under Utah Code Ann. 7-1-7r a statute initially enacted 
in 1911, the institutions over which the state bank commissioner 
(now the Commissioner of Financial Institutions) had authority 
were set out: 
All banks, all loan and trust 
corporations, all building and loan 
associations, all industrial loan 
companies, all credit unions, all small 
loan businesses required to obtain a 
license under any provision of law, and 
all bank service corporations shall be 
under the supervision of the banking 
department, and shall be subject to 
examination by the bank commissioner and 
the examiners. 
Utah Code Ann. 7-1-8, enacted initially in 1913, set out the 
Commissioner's examination responsibility: 
The bank commissioner, or an examiners, 
shall visit and examine every bank, 
savings bank, every loan and trust 
corporation, every building and loan 
association, every industrial loan 
company, every small loan business, and 
every co-operative bank, at least once 
in each year. At every such examination 
careful inquiry shall be made as to the 
condition and resource of the 
institution examined, the mode of 
conducting and managing its affairs, the 
official actions of its directors and 
officers, the investment and disposition 
5
 Title 7 of the Utah Code was repealed and substantially amended 
by the Financial Institutions Act of 1981, current Utah Code Ann. 
7-1-101, et seq. Plaintiffs base their action on Title 7 as it 
existed prior to that time, and any statutory citations to title 
7 sections which follow refer to the pre-1981 statutes. 
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of its funds, the security afforded to 
members, if any, and to those by whom 
its engagements are held, whether or not 
it is violating any of the provisions of 
law relating to corporations or to the 
business of the institution examined, 
whether or not it is complying with its 
articles of incorporation and bylaws, 
and as to such other matters as the 
commissioner may prescribe. 
Prior to 1969, Grove Finance was licensed as a small 
loan business under chapter 10 of title 7 and as an industrial 
loan corporation under chapter 8 (R. 771) . In that year, the 
Utah Legislature enacted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code as 
title 70B of the Code, and repealed chapter 10 of title 7 (see 
Utah Code Ann. 70B-9-103) • There were then no more small loan 
business licenses in Utah, and Grove surrendered its industrial 
loan license, as did many others, electing to be licensed as a 
supervised lender under the U.C.C.C. (R. 771-2) . Licensing as 
supervised lenders for those previously licensed under title 7 
was, by statutory directive, automatic, Utah Code Ann. 70B-9-102 
and accompanying Comment of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 
Thus, after 1969, the State had no regulatory or 
examination authority over Grove Finance under Title 7, because 
Grove was then licensed as a supervised lender under title 70B. 
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The l e g i s l a t i v e h i s tory of sect ion 7-1-76 c l ea r ly demonstrates 
tha t the i n s t i t u t i o n s l i s t e d were purposely and advisedly 
se lec ted by the Legis la ture over an extended period of time; the 
i n t en t obviously was to include only those i n s t i t u t i o n s 
spec i f i ca l ly enumerated in sect ion 7-1-7 within the S t a t e ' s t i t l e 
7 j u r i s d i c t i o n and not to include f inancia l i n s t i t u t i o n s not so 
enumerated. 
Enactment of the U.C.C.C. in Utah in 1969 created new 
categor ies of f inancia l i n s t i t u t i o n s (supervised and regulated 
lenders) and provided separate f l e s s s t r ingen t government 
cont ro ls on such i n s t i t u t i o n s to encourage open entry and 
competition in the cash loan f i e l d . ££. Comment 1 of 
Commissioners on Uniform Sta te Laws to Utah Code Ann. 70B-3-503; 
0
 L. 1913, ch. 45f s ec . 4 o r ig ina l ly provided that "a l l banks 
organized under the laws of t h i s S t a t e , and a l l pr iva te banks 
doing business within the Sta te and any Loan. Trust and Guaranty 
assoc ia t ions" were subject to examination. Subsequently, 
building and loan a s soc ia t ions , doing business within the S ta te 
(L. 1915, ch. 12, sec. 1 ) ; "pp-operative banks for personal 
c r ed i t s " (L. 1915, ch. 120r sec . 5 and L. 1929, ch. 40, sec . 1 ) ; 
"small loan businesses" <L. 1917, ch. 41, sec. 4); and 
" indus t r i a l loan companies" (L. 1925, ch. 116, sec . 7 and L. 
1927, ch. 50, sec. 1) were added to the S t a t e ' s examination j u r i s d i c t i o n , and included as sect ion 7-1-8 in R. S. 1933. The 
reference to "cooperative banks" was l a t e r changed to "credi t 
unions" (L. 1945, ch. 14, sec . 1 ) , and "bank service 
corporations" were included in the sect ion (L. 1963, ch. 7, sec. 
3 ) . National banks were i n i t i a l l y excluded from the banking 
chapter (L. 1911, ch. 25, sec. 42) and from t h i s sect ion (R.S. 
1933, sec . 7-1-8) , but the exclusion was deleted in 1963 (L. 
1963, ch. 7, sec. 3 ) . (All emphasis in footnote added). 
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7 Uniform Laws Annotated, pp. 242-3 J 
Supervised lenders were not made subject to the 
examination and other requirements of T i t l e 7 . F i r s t , from 1969 
to 1981, no change was made in any appl icable language of t i t l e 7 
to refer to "supervised lenders" or "regulated l e n d e r s , " even 
though those two terms were c lear ly defined and the i r unique 
legal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s extensively set out in T i t l e 70B. No 
s t a t u t e in e i ther t i t l e (or elsewhere) empowers the S ta te to 
examine and supervise a l l aspects of the f inancia l soundness of 
supervised and regulated l enders , much l e s s to deploy an army of 
i nves t iga to r s to ensure tha t no such en t i ty ever engages in a 
fraudulent or foolhardy investment a c t i v i t y , much l e s s to 
guarantee a l l funds invested in i n s t i t u t i o n s l icensed as 
supervised l enders . 
Second, both the language of the U.C.C.C. and the 
comments of the Commissioners on Uniform Sta te Laws ind ica te tha t 
"supervised l ende r s , " subject to U.C.C.C. requirements, are 
d i f fe ren t from "supervised f inancia l o rgan iza t ions , " defined as 
f inancia l organizat ions "subject to supervision by an . . . 
agency of t h i s s t a t e . . . . " , Utah Code Ann. 70B-1-30K17) (b) . 
Utah Code Ann. 70B-3-503 s e t s forth l icens ing requirements for 
1
 See tex t of comments in Appendix D. This Court has recognized 
tha t the Commissioners' comments are appropria te aids in 
construing provisions of uniform laws, e . g . , Sta te v. 
Intermountain Farmers Associat ion, 668 P.2d 503 (Utah, 1983). 
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supervised lenders; comment 3 to that section states: 
This section does not Apply to 
supervised financial organizations* 
Their authority to open new offices at 
which the may receive deposits and make 
loans is found not in this Actf but in 
the statutes otherwise governing those 
organizations. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. 70B-3-502(l) states that supervised loans may be 
made only by Ma supervised financial organization £JL "one 
licensed as a supervised lender. Comment 1 to this section 
notes: 
Supervised lenders may include 
supervised financial organizations. . . 
Since supervised financial organizations 
are already subject to a supervision by 
a state or federal official or agency, 
such organizations are not required to 
obtain a license under this Act. . . but 
their power may be limited by statutes 
other than this Act. 
The clear intent is that supervised lenders (such as Grove 
Finance) and supervised financial organizations (which Grove 
Finance was not) be subject to separate statutory schemes, and 
not simply lumped together for regulatory purposes. While it is 
true that supervised financial organizations, already subject to 
regulation under other laws, may sometimes also qualify as 
supervised lenders, the converse is not true; no statute makes 
lenders licensed under Title 70B subject to control under Title 
Appellants also claim (Appellants' Brief, p. 9) that 
the State had a duty to examine Grove for financial soundness 
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under Utah Code Ann. 70B-3-506, requiring the Commissioner to 
•"examine periodically . . . the loans, business and records" of 
each licensee, and under Utah Code Ann. 7QB-3-505(l): 
Every licensee shall maintain records in 
conformity with generally accepted 
accounting principles and practices in a 
manner that will enable the 
aamirustratpr tp determine whether the 
licensee is complying with the 
provisions of this actt The record 
keeping system pf e licensee shall be 
sufficient if he makes the required 
information reegpnably ev&ileble . . • . 
(Emphasis added)• 
Appellants' interpretation, of course, ignores the statutory 
language emphasized above. The requirement is that records be 
kept to permit a determination of compliance with the provisions 
of the U.C.C.C.: and if such compliance can be determined, the 
record are sufficient. U.C.C.C. requirements for supervised 
lenders relate to disclosure (e.g., Utah Code Ann. 70B-2-301, et 
seq. and -3-301, et seq.) and maximum charges (e.g., Utah Code 
Ann. 70B-3-508 and -511). No provision of the U.C.C.C. requires 
the State to probe into or insure the financial integrity of 
supervised lenders, or to exercise the more stringent supervisory 
powers which pertained to title 7 entities. Furthermore, it is 
clear on the record and not disputed that the Grove Finance 
records pertaining to supervised loans were generally in 
accordance with accepted accounting principles (Sherwood 
deposition, p. 39), fulfilling any duty imposed by Utah Code Ann. 
70B-3-505(l) . 
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The record now before the Court attests that Grove 
Finance complied with all reporting requirements, both as a small 
loan business and as a supervised lender, and that examinations 
by the Department of Financial Institutions indicated no U.C.C.C. 
violations, prior to issuance of the cease-and-desist order in 
1980 (R. 771-3, 717-47). Appellants have not alleged that their 
loss resulted from any violation of disclosure rules or of 
maximum charge limits or of any other substantive restriction on 
supervised lenders imposed by the U.C.C.C, and Respondents are 
not aware of any such violation. Appellant would have the Court 
go far beyond the statutory directive for the Department to 
receive reports and perform examinations for U.C.C.C. 
compliance—Appellants would impose a duty on the State to make 
all supervised lenders failure-proof and all investments in such 
entities loss-proof. There is simply no basis for concluding 
that the Utah Legislature intended to impose such a duty on the 
State, or to allow potential enormous liability to result from 
the State's examinations. 
B. DUTY QF CARE 
The commanding majority of cases considering the issue 
have concluded that, even where a statutory duty exists to 
regulate financial institutions, no duty of care exists in the 
regulating agency upon which tort liability may be based for 
disappointed creditors or investors. No statutory duty of 
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supervision exists in the instant matter, but even if it did, 
Appellants still could not recover. 
Perhaps the best-reasoned of numerous opinions on this 
issue are two which concern the failure of Franklin National 
Bank, the largest bank failure in United States history. In 
complex litigation involving the F.D.I.C., auditors and insurance 
companies, the United States was named as a third-party defendant 
on the grounds that bank inspections and other regulatory 
functions were performed negligently. 
In re Franklin National Bank Securities Litigation, 445 
F.Supp. 723 (E.D.N.Y., 1978), the Court considered the 
government's motion to dismiss. In an attempt to establish a 
duty running to the bank and its shareholders, the third-party 
plaintiffs cited the mandatory language of 12 U.S.C. 481, 
providing, "The Comptroller of the Currency . . . .shall examine 
every national bank twice in each calendar year. . . . " 
(emphasis added). The Court found no duty on that basis. 
Notwithstanding possible incidental 
benefits to the examined banks, to hold 
that the examinations were therefore 
designed to protect the shareholders, 
officers or directors from any fraud at 
these banks would make the United States 
an insurer of all banking activities. 
This would be an enormous liability that 
should not be read into the statute 
absent a clearer expression of 
congressional intent. . . . (emphasis 
added)• 
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The third-party plaintiffs also alleged that the government 
assumed a duty toward the bank and its shareholders by extensive 
involvement in the daily operations of the bank for a 
considerable time before its insolvency. The Court held that the 
government assumed no duty by regulating a bank, such that 
negligent regulation would give rise to tort liability. 1£. at 
732. Nevertheless, the Court found this "an extraordinary case," 
where the completion of discovery was necessary, so the motion 
was denied, JJGU at 734, without prejudice to a motion for summary 
judgment, id. at 728. 
Subsequently, in re Franklin National Bank Securities 
Litigation, supra, 478 F.Supp. 210 (E.D.N.Y., 1979), the 
government's motion for summary judgment was granted. The Court 
found no theory of duty (either a statutory duty or an assumed 
duty) to be convincing, and noted that, "So far no court has held 
that any of the statutory provisions" regarding the Comptroller, 
Federal Reserve Bank, or F.D.I.C., "create any actionable duty 
running to the regulated institutions." Id. at 214. The court 
stated that supervision of the banking system was for the 
protection of the public as a whole, not for the protection of 
individual banks and their shareholders. 
This analysis has led every court 
addressing the issue to conclude that 
the Comptroller's mandate to conduct 
national bank examinations does not 
create an actionable duty running to the 
examined bank; the Comptroller's failure 
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to detect weakness or dishonesty at an 
examined bank gives rise to no cause of 
action against the United States. . . . 
1£. at 215 (emphasis added). 
Other cases where the duty issue has been examined 
include First State Bank of Hudson County v. United States. 599 
F.2d 588 (3d Cir.f 1979), cert. dfiH.r 444 U.S. 1013, 100 S.Ct. 
662 (1980), supra (affirming dismissal of action on failure of 
F.D.I.C. examiner to warn bank of discovered criminal activities 
by bank officer); Harmsen v. Smith. 586 F.2d 156 (9th Cir., 1978) 
(affirming dismissal of action for Comptroller's negligent 
failure to discover illegal practices during bank examination); 
Davis v. F.D.I.C,. 369 F.Supp. 277 (D. Colo., 1974) (dismissing 
action for failure to notify public of discovered irregularities 
in bank); and Social Security Administration Baltimore Federal 
Credit Union v. United States, 138 F.Supp. 639 (D. Md., 1956) 
(holding of no duty and no liability for negligent failure of 
government examiners to discover embezzlement by credit union 
official). 
In earlier proceedings in this matter, Appellants have 
cited Tcherepnin v. Franz, 570 F.2d 187 (7th Cir.r 1978)f cert. 
d£H.r 439 U.S. 876, 99 S.Ct. 214 (1978)f and State v. Superior 
Court of Maricopa County. 123 Ariz. 324, 599 p.2d 777 (1979), 
where regulatory agencies have been found to have a duty running 
to creditors of failed financial entities. These cases are the 
only cases so holding, are poorly reasoned and aberrational, and 
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have been consistently distinguished and avoided by courts in the 
states where they were handed down (££., e.g., Cady v. Statef 129 
Ariz. 258, 630 P.2d 554 (1981), and Hicks v. Williams. 104 
Ill.App.3d 172, 432 N.E.2d 1278 (1982), and analysis of these 
cases at R. 629-33) . At this junction, it may suffice simply to 
point out that (l) Tcherepnin and state v. Superior Court 
involved the failure of a savings association and two thrift 
associations, respectively—entities whose financial soundness 
government had a clear statutory duty to supervise, unlike the 
instant case; and (2) the holdings in those cases were based on 
repeated statutory references to protection of those in the 
plaintiffs' class, an aspect entirely absent from this case. 
A far more sound consideration of the question is 
Commonwealth. Department of Banking & Securities v. Brown. 605 
S.W.2d 497 (Ky., 1980), where the plaintiffs sought damages for 
the dereliction of state examiners in not ascertaining or 
reporting the true condition of the records of two building and 
loan associations. Reversing a judgment and dismissing the 
action, the Kentucky Supreme Court stated: 
There is no public policy requiring 
government to guarantee the success of 
its efforts. When the governmental 
entity is performing a self-imposed 
protective function as it was in the 
case at hand, the individual citizen has 
no right to demand recourse against it 
though he is injured by its failure to 
efficiently perform such function. Any 
ruling to the contrary would tend to 
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constitute the Commonwealth an insurer 
of the quality of services its many 
agents perform and serve only to stifle 
government's attempts to provide needed 
services to the public which could not 
otherwise be effectively supplied. 
Id. at 499. Conceding that the state may sometimes act 
imperfectly, but finding that risk to be "the natural concomitant 
of our form of government," the Court continued: 
We perceive that the public interest is 
better served by a government which can 
aggressively seek to identify and meet 
the current needs of the citizenry, 
uninhibited by the threat of financial 
loss should its good faith efforts 
provide less than optimal—or even 
desirable—results. Id. 
Respondents are not aware of any case, in any 
jurisdiction, where an administrator under the U.C.C.C. has been 
found liable for any failure to properly regulate a supervised 
lender. As noted above, suits to recover damages for bank 
failures have regularly been dismissed; the same result must 
obtain, a fortiori, for the failure of a supervised lender, where 
government's statutory duty of supervision is far less stringent 
than for banks and most other kinds of financial institutions. 
m Little Y. Utah State Division of Family Services, 
supra. 667 P.2d 49 (Utah, 1983), this Court recently applied a 
duty-risk analysis in reviewing a negligence judgment, relying on 
Professor Thode's article, "Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. 
Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Functions Between 
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Judge and Jury," at 1977 Utah L. Rev. 1. According to Professor 
Thode, the duty-risk determination of whether the legal system's 
protection extends to the risk in question—i.e., whether the 
risk to which the plaintiff was subjected was within the scope of 
the defendant's duty—is entirely a legal question for the court 
to determine, based upon a weighing of public policy and other 
pertinent considerations. Thode, £p. jcii^ r 26-28; see Little, 
supra. 667 P.2d at 54, where the Court looks to applicable 
statutes in determining the scope of the duty of a state agency. 
In the instant matter, the absence of statutory duty 
has already been discussed, and the sound public policy grounds 
for finding no duty are evident. If government is found to have 
a duty upon which tort liability can be based toward every person 
affected by an activity which government must, by statute, 
regulate, then government becomes an insurer for the total safety 
and soundness of all regulated activities. In particular, if, as 
here, an agency is charged by statute with limited regulatory 
duties for a particular kind of business, and on that basis a 
duty is inferred to protect all parties from any loss arising 
from any activity of the business, it is difficult to foresee the 
extent to which government's liability for not providing an 
injury-free society may extend. 
Furthermore, there is and can be no allegation here 
that any action or inaction of Respondents gave rise to any 
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justifiable reliance by Grove Finance investors on which any 
theory of an assumption of duty could be based. From 1969 on, 
the Department of Financial Institutions did not examine or 
regulate supervised lenders for financial soundness, and that 
policy applied across the board to all supervised and regulated 
lenders licensed under the U.C.C.C. (R. 772, 786). 
There is simply no basis, statutory, common-law, 
common-sense, or otherwise, to extend the State's duty to 
protecting all investors in Appellants" class. As a matter of 
law, no liability may be found. 
III. APPELLANTS' CHALLENGE TO THE MONETARY 
LIABILITY LIMITS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT ON EQUAL PROTECTION GROUNDS 
WAS NOT PROPERLY RAISED IN THE DISTRICT 
COURT; IS NOT RIPE FOR DECISION IN THIS 
ACTION; AND IN ANY EVENT, HAS NO MERIT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
In Point V of their Brief, Appellants argue that the 
statutory limit on the amount which may be recovered in an action 
against a governmental entity or employee, currently codified in 
Utah Code Ann. 63-30-34,8 violates the equal protection 
provisions of the United States Constitution (Fourteenth 
Amendment, sec. 1) and Utah Constitution (article I, sec. 24). 
8
 At the time Grove Finance closed its doors, Utah Code Ann. 
63-30-34 instructed courts to reduce judgments against 
governmental entities and their employees to the dollar limits 
then set out in Utah Code Ann. 63-30-29; see text of these 
sections in Utah Code Ann., 1981 pocket supplement to second 
replacement volume 7A and in Appendix B herein. 
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This Court has held that issues not raised in the trial 
court on motions for summary judgment may not be raised for the 
first time on appeal and be considered, e.g., Franklin Financial 
v« New Empire Development company, 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah, 1983), 
Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah, 1983). The same rule 
applies to the raising of constitutional issues, where no 
individual's liberty is at stake, Pratt v. City Council of City 
of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172 (Utah, 1981) . A review of each of the 
memoranda of law submitted by Appellants below, pertaining to 
their own and Respondents' summary judgment motions (R. 656-87, 
838-63, 949-59), fails to disclose any mention of a 
constitutional question as to the liability limits. Nor was the 
matter raised in oral argument. The issue not having been raised 
or considered below, it may not be raised now for the first time. 
Furthermore, this Court has very properly disfavored 
the rendering of advisory opinions, particularly on 
constitutional issues, where a challenged statute has not been 
applied to a litigant's disadvantage: 
[A] fundamental rule of long-standing is 
that unnecessary decisions are to be 
avoided and that the courts should pass 
upon the constitutionality of a statute 
only when such a determination is 
essential to the decision in a case. A 
constitutional question does not arise 
merely because it is raised and a 
decision is sought thereon. . . . 
A further fundamental rule is that the 
courts do not busy themselves with 
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advisory opinions. . . It has been found 
to be far wiser, and it has become 
settled as a general principle, that a 
constitutional question is not to be 
reached if the merits of the case in 
hand may be fairly determined on other 
than constitutional issues. 
Hoyle v. Monson. 606 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah, 1980). An appellant 
affected by one portion of a statute or act may not attack the 
constitutionality of another portion of the same act not 
applicable to his case, Cavaness v. Cox, 598 P.2d 349, 351-2 
(Utah, 1979). 
As of 1980, Utah Code Ann. 63-30-34 stated: 
If any judgment or award against a 
governmental entity . . . or against a 
governmental employee . . . exceeds the 
minimum amounts . . . specified in 
section 63-30-29, the court shall reduce 
the amount of the judgment or award to a 
sum equal to the minimum requirements 
• • • • 
By its clear terms, the statute does not apply unless and until a 
judgment or award in excess of the statutory limits is entered. 
Of course, no judgment of any kind has been entered in this case, 
and it is entirely problematic and speculative at this point 
whether or not any judgment in excess of the statutory limits 
will ever be entered. Appellants clearly seek an advisory 
opinion on a statute which has not been, and may never be, 
applied to them. The question is not ripe for decision (and, in 
any event, Respondents submit that the non-constitutional grounds 
set forth in Points I and II herein are dispositve of this case). 
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Finally, even assuming arguendo that the issue is 
properly before the Court, Appellants1 legal argument simply does 
not hold water. Numerous courts have upheld statutory limits on 
governmental liability under equal protection attack, pursuant to 
both the Fourteenth Amendment and state constitutional 
provisions, e.g., Packard v. Joint School District No. 171# 104 
Idaho 604, 661 P.2d 770 (Ida. App., 1983); Leliefeld v. Johnson, 
104 Idaho 357, 659 p.2d i n (1983); Winston Vt Reorganized School 
District R-2r 636 S.W.2d 324 (Mo., 1982); Sambs v. City of 
Brookfield. 97 Wis.2d 356, 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980), cert, den., 449 
U.S. 1035, 101 S.Ct. 611 (1981); Stanhope v. Brown County, 90 
Wis.2d 823, 280 N.W.2d 711 (1979); Estate of Cargill v. City of 
Rochester, 406 A.2d 704 (N.H., 1979), appeal dismissed/ 445 u.s. 
921, 100 S.ct. 1304 (1980). Each of these cases held, applying 
the "rational basis" test for equal protection, that the 
limitation statutes reasonably served a valid legislative 
objective: "To compensate victims of government tortfeasors 
while at the same time protecting the public treasury." Stanhope 
v. Brown County, supraf 280 N.W.2d at 719. These cases are fully 
in line with the strong line of cases holding that state tort 
claims and governmental immunity acts do not violate federal and 
state equal protection guarantees, e.g., Brown v. Wichita State 
University, 547 P.2d 1015 (Kan., 1976), and cases cited therein 
at 1026. Brown also applied a "rational basis" test, and noted, 
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•'There are no cases which hold governmental immunity invalid 
based on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment." Id. at 1029. 
This Court has consistently looked to a "rational 
basis" test for its equal protection analysis where no 
fundamental right is in question, holding that a legislative 
classification "must be merely rationally related to a valid 
public purpose" to withstand Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny. Utah 
Public Employees' Association v. State, 610 P,2d 1272, 1273 
(Utah, 1980). 
When neither a fundamental right nor a 
suspect classification is involved, 
equal protection requires that statutory 
classifications bear a reasonable 
relation to the purpose sought to be 
accomplished and that there be a 
reasonable basis for the distinction 
between the classes. 
J.J.N.P. Company v. State, 655 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah, 1982). 
This same "rational basis" test applies when an equal protection 
attack is based upon Article I, section 24 of the Utah 
Constitution, IJQ. ; Liedtke v. Schettler, 649 P.2d 80 (Utah, 
1982) . 
It is also noteworthy that the United States Supreme 
Court has applied a "rational basis" test in reviewing the equal-
protection validity of statutes limiting the amount of monetary 
liability for nuclear incidents, Duke Power Company v. Carolina 
Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 98 S.Ct. 2620 
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(1978); see also Continental Insurance Company yt Illinois 
Department of Transportation, 709 F.2d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 1983) , 
suggesting that a "rational basis" test would be the appropriate 
equal-protection means of review of a state statute limiting 
governmental liability to $100,000• 
Respondents submit that there is no fundamental right 
to have unlimited recovery against governmental entities; that, 
therefore, the "rational basis" test is the proper means of 
assessing Utah's liability limits under both state and federal 
constitutional equal protection provisions; and that the 
liability limits are rationally related to the valid public 
purpose of providing some measure of recovery for injured parties 
while protecting the fiscal means or providing necessary 
governmental services. 
Appellants have cited what appears to be the only case 
invalidating a state liability limit and applying a "strict 
scrutiny" test rather than a "rational basis" test, white v. 
State, 661 P.2d 1272 (Mont., 1983). Yet even that court 
acknowledged, "We recognize that some limit on the State's 
liability may comport with the constitutional guarantees of equal 
protection." Xd. at 1275. The White ruling invalidated a 
statutory scheme which limited recovery of economic damages and 
completely barred recovery of non-economic damages, a result 
inapposite to Utah Code Ann. 63-30-34, which makes no such 
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distinction. The Montana Court based its result on a state 
constitutional provision guaranteeing a "speedy remedy . . . for 
every injury of person, property, or character" (Montana 
Constitution article II, section 16), similar to Utah's 
guarantee of a "remedy by due course of law" for "an injury done" 
to one's "person, property or reputation. . ." (Utah 
Constitution article If section 11). This Court has recently 
ruled that sovereign immunity does not violate article I, section 
11, Madsen v. Borthick. supra, 658 P.2d at 629. 
Also, it has been recognized that the white decision 
deviates from decisions in "the vast majority of courts which 
have held that statutes limiting or barring governmental 
liability are measured by the rational basis test," Ryszkiewicz 
v. City of New Britain. 193 Conn. 589, 479 A.2d 793, 799 (1984), 
and cases cited therein. Respondents submit that the white case 
reaches an aberrant conclusion, based upon a particular statutory 
approach which does not resemble Utah Code Ann. 63-30-34, and is 
not sound precedent as to the application of Utah and federal 
constitutional analyses. 
This Court has recently recognized that a statute may 
violate article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution where it 
is "so shot-through with exceptions as to be incapable of 
reasonably furthering the statutory objectives." Malan v. Lewis, 
no. 17606, slip op. at 16 (Utah, May 1, 1984). This is not such 
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a case. Utah Code Ann. 63-30-34 applies across the board to all 
parties who are granted judgments in excess of the specified 
limits, suggesting no ••crazy-quilt'1 or discriminatory pattern of 
application. Furthermore, Madsen V. BorthicK, supra, emphasized 
that sovereign immunity "was a well-settled principle of American 
common law at the time Utah became a state," 658 P.2d at 629, and 
hence, at the time Article I, section 24 was enacted. Absolute 
sovereign immunity did not violate that section, and it clearly 
would not be violated by a statutory provision which waives 
immunity up to certain levels of recovery, and operates uniformly 
on all who recover judgments in tort up to or over those levels. 
In sum, no basis exists for Appellants' contention that 
Utah Code Ann. 63-30-34 violates state and federal equal 
protection principles—even if that question were properly before 
the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Regulation of financial institutions is a governmental 
function, subject to provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act. The substantive exceptions to the Act's waiver of immunity 
in Utah Code Ann. 63-30-10(1)(a), (c), (d), and (f) clearly bar 
suit in this matter, and the District Court's order should be 
affirmed. 
As a matter of law, Respondents had no statutory duty 
and no duty of care upon which liability may be based, extending 
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to Appellants, To hold otherwise would go far toward a legal 
requirement impossible of attainment that governmental agencies 
with limited regulatory responsibilities in a given area must 
somehow render injury-proof all activities undertaken by private 
parties in the area. 
Appellants' attempt to raise the issue of whether 
Utah's governmental liability limits (Utah Code Ann. 63-30-34) 
violate equal protection is not well-founded as a matter of law, 
and in any event is untimely and not ripe for decision, and 
should be disregarded. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ ^ day
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MATHEW FENN HILTON, et al., : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiffs, : CIVIL NOS. C-82-5165 
vs. : C-82-5872 
MIRVIN D. BORTHICK, et al., 
Defendants. 
C-82-3798 
(Consolidated) 
The Motions-of the plaintiffs for Summary Judgment, and the 
reciprocal Motions for Summary Judgment of the defendants all 
came on regularly for hearing on November 3, 1983. Argument 
was had on that date, and the hearing was continued to November 8, 
1983 for further argument. The matters before the Court in the 
above-referenced civil numbers have all been consolidated 
into one action. All interested parties were present or 
represented by counsel at the hearings above-referenced. Counsel 
argued their respective positions, and the Court granted 
defendants' Motion to open and publish Depositions of Howard 
Sherwood and Mirvin Borthick. The Court took the matter under 
advisement to further review the extensive Memoranda filed by 
the parties, and to review the case law cited by counsel. The 
Court has now carefully considered the arguments advanced by 
HILTON, ET AL VS, 
BORTHICK, ET AL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
the respective parties, and the case law authority cited by 
all counsel to the controversy, and otherwise being fully 
advised, enters the following Memorandum Decision. 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Based upon the Court's review of this matter, including 
the Affidavits, Depositions and matters in the file and the legal 
authorities cited, the Court concludes that the plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment must be denied in that there are existing 
significant and material issues of fact to be determined by the 
trier of fact. The material issues of fact prohibit this Court from 
passing on the questions presented as a matter of law on a 
motion for summary judgment. Likewise, plaintiffs1 more limited 
request, presented orally at the time of the argument in this 
matter, that this Court determine at this stage of the proceedings 
what statutory duties, if any there be, apply to the facts of 
this case, must also be denied. This Court should not, under 
the disputed facts of this case, determine what statutory 
standards may apply to the defendants at this stage of the 
proceedings. Such a decision should be made when the evidence 
is in, or sufficient evidence is presented to allow this Court 
to reach some determinations on the respective theories of 
liability, and make appropriate decisions based upon the evidence 
then presented as to what statutory duties or other duties 
that may run from the defendants to the plaintiffs may be-
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DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
As to the defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
that portion thereof which seeks a ruling of this Court that 
$11 obligations toward the plaintiffs were adhered to as a 
matter of law by the defendants, this Court must similarly deny 
such a request as was done in the plaintiffs1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment, there being substantial and material questions of fact 
remaining for determination. 
Dealing with that portion of the defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment asserting the defense of governmental immunity, 
the Court is compelled to reach a substantially different result. 
Based upon the case authority cited by the defendants, including 
the Utah Supreme Court language in Madscn vs. Borthick, 
656 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983), supervision of a financial institution, 
as was the situation here, constitutes a governmental activity. 
Accordingly, unless the governmental immunity statute waives 
governmental immunity, the action must be dismissed. Under the 
laws of this state, governmental immunity has been waived for 
negligent acts and/or omissions of state employees, unless 
the conduct falls into those specific exceptions listed in 
Section 63-30-10 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
Addressing the question as to whether or not the alleged conduct 
of. the defendants falls into the exceptions where governmental 
immunity is not waived under the subparts of Section 63-30-10, 
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this Court finds that the defendants' arguments are persuasive. 
The claims asserted against the defendants arise out of acts or 
omissions that fall into the exceptions listed in Section 63-30-10. 
The nature of defendant Borthick''s actions or claimed failure 
to act, even if such were proven, are discretionary, and 
do not fall into a class of activities where governmental 
immunity has been waived. *The alleged misrepresentations of the 
defendants are not waived under Section 63-30-10. The alleged 
errors of the defendants in issuing or revoking licenses 
are also not waived under Section 63-30-10. The foregoing, 
coupled with the policy reasons enumerated by the Supreme Court 
for not imposing liability on public officials who perform 
discretionary functions in good faith, leads this Court to the 
conclusion that that portion of the defendants1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment asserting the defense of governmental immunity 
is well taken and should be the finding of this Court in this 
case. It follows that as no claim against the state can be 
maintained, there therefore can be no claim against Commissioner 
Borthick. Plaintiffs' claims against the defendants are 
therefore dismissed on the basis of governmental immunity. 
Counsel for the defendants is to prepare an appropriate 
Order in conformance with this Memorandum Decision, and submit 
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jthe same to the Court for review and signature pursuant "to 
Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice for the District and Circuit 
Courts of the State of Utah. 
Dated this Sty day of April, 1984. 
pi 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPENDIX B 
TEXT OF STATUTES AND RULES CITED 
(Note: The texts of session laws and of statutes cited only by 
chapter or sub-chapter are not included). 
1. Utah 
Utah Constitution, article Ir section 11: 
All courts shall be open, and every 
person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall 
be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to 
which he is a party, 
Utah Constitution article If section 24: 
All laws of a general nature shall 
have uniform operation. 
Utah Code Annt 7-1-6 (prior to repeal in 1981): 
The bank commissioner, with the 
advice and consent of the governor, may 
appoint such examiners as shall be 
required for the proper conduct of the 
banking department; one of whom he may 
designate as chief examiner at a salary 
to be fixed in accordance with standards 
adopted by the department of finance, 
who in the absence of disability of the 
bank commissioner shall exercise all of 
the powers of the bank commissioner, 
except those required of him as a member 
of any board. Such examiners shall hold 
a corporate surety bond in such form and 
in such amount as shall be determined by 
the state department of finance, 
conditioned for the faithful performance 
of his duties. The premium on such bond 
shall be paid by the state. Such 
examiners shall not be interested 
directly or indirectly in any 
institution under the supervision of the 
banking department. They shall perform 
such duties as are prescribed by this 
title or that may be assigned to them by 
-i-
the bank commissioner. The bank 
commissioner may also with the approval 
of the finance commission employ such 
clerical help as may be necessary for 
the proper carrying on of the work of 
the banking department. The salaries of 
examiners and of such assistants shall 
be fixed in accordance with salary 
standards adopted by the department of 
finance and shall be payable monthly as 
the salaries of other state employees 
7-1-7 (prior to repeal in 1981): 
All banks, all loan and trust 
corporations, all building and loan 
associations, all industrial loan 
companies, all credit unions, all small 
loan businesses required to obtain a 
license under any provision of law, and 
all bank service corporations shall be 
under the supervision of the banking 
department, and shall be subject to 
examination by the bank commissioner and 
the examiners. 
7-1-8 (prior to repeal in 1981): 
The bank commissioner, or an 
examiner, shall visit and examine every 
bank, savings bank, every loan and trust 
company, every small loan business, and 
every co-operative bank, at least once 
in each year. At every such examination 
careful inquiry shall be made as to the 
condition and resources of the 
institution examined, the mode of 
conducting and managing its affairs, the 
official actions of its directors and 
officers, the investment and disposition 
of its funds, the security afforded to 
members, if any, and to those by whom 
its engagements are held, whether or not 
it is violating any of the provisions of 
law relating to corporations or to the 
business of the institution examined, 
whether or not it is complying with its 
articles of incorporation and bylaws, 
and as to such other matters as the 
commissioner may prescribe. 
-ii-
Utah Code Ann, 35-9-13(d): 
If the administrator arbitrarily or 
capriciously fails to seek relief under 
this section, any employee who may be 
injured by reason of such failure, or 
the representative of such employees, 
may bring an action against the 
administrator in the district court of 
the county in which the imminent danger 
is alleged to exist or the employer has 
its principal office, for a writ of 
mandamus and for further appropriate 
relief. 
Utah Code Ann, 63-30-4 (prior to amendment in 1983): 
Nothing contained in this act, 
unless specifically provided, is to be 
construed as an admission or denial of 
liability or responsibility in so far as 
governmental entities are concerned. 
Wherein immunity from suit is waived by 
this act, consent to be sued is granted 
and liability for the entity shall be 
determined as if the entity were a 
private person. 
The remedy against a governmental 
entity or its employee for an injury 
caused by an act or omission which 
occurs during the performance of such 
employee's duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority 
is, after the effective date of this 
act, exclusive of any other civil action 
or proceeding by reason of the same 
subject matter against the employee or 
the estate of the employee whose act or 
omission gave rise to the claim, unless 
the employee acted or failed to act 
through gross negligence, fraud, or 
malice. 
An employee may be joined in an 
action against a governmental entity in 
a representative capacity if the act or 
omission complained of is one for which 
the governmental entity may be liable, 
but no employee shall be held personally 
liable for acts or omissions occurring 
during the performance of the employee's 
duties, within the scope of employment 
or under color of authority, unless it 
is established that the employee acted 
or failed to act due to gross 
negligence, fraud or malice. 
-iii-
Utah Code Ann, 63-30-10(1): 
Immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived for 
injury proximately caused by a negligent 
act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of his employment 
except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or 
performance or the failure to exercise 
or perform a discretionary function, 
whether or not the discretion is abused, 
or 
• • • 
(c) arises out of the issuance, 
denial, suspension, or revocation of, or 
by the failure or refusal to issue, 
deny, suspend or revoke, any permit, 
license, certificate, approval, order, 
or similar authorization, or 
(d) arises out of a failure to make 
an inspection, or by reason of making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection of 
any property, or 
(e) arises out of the institution 
or prosecution of any judicial or 
administrative proceeding, even if 
malicious or without probable cause, or 
(f) arises out of a 
misrepresentation by said employee 
whether or not such is negligent or 
intentional, 
Utah Code Ann, 63-30-29 (prior to repeal in 1983): 
Every policy or contract of 
insurance purchased by a governmental 
entity as permitted under the provisions 
of this chapter shall provide: 
(a) In respect to bodily injury 
liability that the insurance carrier 
shall pay on behalf of the insured 
governmental entity all sums which the 
insured would be legally obligated to 
pay as damages because of bodily injury, 
sickness or disease, including death 
resulting therefrom, sustained by any 
person, caused by accident, and arising 
out of the ownership, maintenance and 
use of automobiles, or arising out of 
the ownership, maintenance or use of 
premises, and all operations necessary 
or incidental thereto, or in respect to 
other operations and caused by accident 
—-i \ r — 
subject to a limit, exclusive of 
interests and costs, of not less than 
$100,000 because of bodily injury to or 
death of one person in any one accident 
and, subject to said limit for one 
person, to a limit of not less than 
$300,000 because of bodily injury or 
death of two or more persons in any one 
accident. 
(b) In respect to property damage 
liability that the insurance carrier 
shall pay on behalf of the insured 
governmental entity all sums which the 
insured would in the absence of the 
defense of governmental immunity be 
legally obligated to pay as damages 
because of injury to or destruction of 
property, including the loss of use 
thereof, caused by accident, and arising 
out of the ownership, maintenance and 
use of automobiles, or arising out of 
the ownership, maintenance or use of 
premises, and all operations necessary 
or incidental thereto, or in respect to 
other operations and caused by accident 
to a limit of not less than $50,000 
because of injury to or destruction of 
property of others in any one accident. 
Ptfth Code hnn. 63-30-34 (prior to amendment in 1983): 
If any judgment or award against a 
governmental entity under sections 
63-30-7, 63-30-8, 63-30-9, and 63-30-10, 
or against a governmental employee for 
which a governmental entity may have a 
statutory duty to indemnify the 
employee, exceeds the minimum amounts 
for bodily injury and property damage 
liability specified in section 63-30-29, 
the court shall reduce the amount of the 
judgment or award to a sum equal to the 
minimum requirements unless the 
governmental entity has secured 
insurance coverage in excess of said 
minimum requirements in which event the 
court shall reduce the amount of the 
judgment or award to a sum equal to the 
applicable limits provided in the 
insurance policy. 
-v-
Any governmental entity that acts 
as a self-insurer under section 63-30-28 
is liable for any judgment or award 
entered against it or its employee under 
sections 63-30-7, 63-30-8f 63-30-9, and 
63-30-10, and is liable to indemnify its 
employees against personal liability in 
accordance with sections 63-48-1 through 
63-48-7, but only to the extent of the 
minimum amounts for bodily injury and 
property damage liability specified in 
section 63-30-29, and no judgment or 
award shall be entered in such action in 
excess of such minimum amounts. 
Utah Code Ann, 70B-1-301(17) (prior to recodification as -301(8) 
in 1983: 
"Supervised financial organization" 
means a person, other than an insurance 
company or other organization primarily 
engaged in an insurance business, 
(a) organized, chartered, or holding an 
authorization certificate under the laws 
of this state or of the United States 
which authorize the person to make loans 
and to receive deposits, including a 
savings, share, certificate or deposit 
account, and 
(b) subject to supervision by an 
official or agency of this state or of 
the United States. 
Utah Code APPt 7QB~3-5Q2(1): 
Unless a person is a supervised 
financial organization or has first 
obtained a license from the 
administrator authorizing him to make 
supervised loans, he shall not engage in 
the business of: 
(a) making supervised loans, or 
(b) taking assignments of and 
undertaking direct collection of 
payments from or enforcement of rights 
against debtors arising from supervised 
loans, but he may collect and enforce 
for three months without a license if he 
promptly applies for a license and his 
application has not been denied. 
(See Commissioners' comments in appendix D, inlia.) . 
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Utah Code Ann. 7QB-3-5Q5 (prior to amendment in 1983): 
(1) Every licensee shall maintain 
records in conformity with generally 
accepted accounting principles and 
practices in a manner that will enable 
the administrator to determine whether 
the licensee is complying with the 
provisions of this act. The record 
keeping system of a licensee shall be 
sufficient if he makes the required 
information reasonably available. The 
records need not be kept in the place of 
business where supervised loans are 
made, if the administrator is given free 
access to the records wherever located. 
The records pertaining to any loan need 
not be preserved for more than two years 
after making the final entry relating to 
the loanf but in the case of a revolving 
loan account the two years is measured 
from the date of each entry. 
(2) On or before April 15 of each year 
every licensee shall file with the 
administrator a composite annual report 
in the form prescribed by the 
administrator relating to all supervised 
loans made by him. The administrator 
shall consult with comparable officials 
in other states for the purpose of 
making the kinds of information required 
in annual reports uniform among the 
states. Information contained in annual 
reports shall be confidential and may be 
published only in composite form. 
(See Commissioners' comment in Appendix D, infxa). 
UUfr Code Ann, 7QB-3-5Q6: 
(1) The administrator shall examine 
periodically at intervals he deems 
appropriate the loansr business, and 
records of every licensee. In additionf 
for the purpose of discovering 
violations of this act or securing 
information lawfully required, the 
administrator or the official or agency 
to whose supervision the organization is 
subject (section 70B-6-105) may at any 
time investigate the loans, business, 
and records of any regulated lender. 
For these purposes he shall have free 
and reasonable access to the offices, 
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places of business, and records of the 
lender. • . . 
(See Commissioners1 comment in appendix D, infra). 
Utah Code Ann, 7QB-3-508 (prior to amendment in 1983): 
(1) With respect to a supervised loan, 
including a loan pursuant to a revolving 
loan account, a supervised lender may 
contract for and receive a loan finance 
charge not exceeding that permitted by 
this section, 
(2) The loan finance charge, calculated 
according to the actuarial method may 
not exceed the equivalent of the greater 
of either of the following: 
Utfrh Code Ann> 70B-3-511 (prior to amendment in 1983): 
(1) Regulated loans, not made pursuant 
to a revolving loan account and in which 
the principal is $1,000 or less, shall 
be scheduled to be payable in 
substantially equal installments at 
equal periodic intervals except to the 
extent that the schedule of payments is 
adjusted to the seasonable or irregular 
income of the debtor, and 
(a) over a period of not more than 
37 months if the principal is more than 
§300, or 
(b) over a period of not more than 
25 months if the principal is $300 or 
less. Nothing herein shall prevent full 
payment without penalty, and provided 
further, interest may be charged only to 
date of prepayment. Except as 
specifically provided for in this act. 
(2) The amounts of $300 and $1,000 in 
subsection (1) are subject to change 
pursuant to the provisions on adjustment 
of dollar amounts (section 70B-1-106). 
Utah Code Amu 7QB-9-1Q2: 
All persons licensed or otherwise 
authorized under the provisions of Title 
7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, on the 
effective date of this act are licensed 
to make supervised loans under this act 
pursuant to the part on Regulated and 
Supervised Loans (sections 70B-3-501 to 
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7QB-3-514) of the chapter on Loans 
(sections 70B-3-101 to 70B-3-605), and 
all provisions of that part apply to the 
persons so previously licensed or 
authorized. The administrator may, but 
is not required to, deliver evidence of 
licensing to the persons so previously 
licensed or authorized. 
(See Commissioner's comment in Appendix Dr Infxfi)• 
Utah Code Annf 7QB-9-1Q3; 
(1) The following acts and parts of the 
acts are repealed: 
(a) Chapter 10 of Title 7, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953; . . . . 
2. Federal 
U« S. Constitution! Fourteenth Amendment, section 1: 
All persons born or naturalized in 
the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of 
the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall 
any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
12 U.S.C. 481 (prior to amendment in 1980): 
The Comptroller of the Currency, 
with the approval of the Secretary of 
the Treasury, shall appoint examiners 
who shall examine every national bank 
twice in each calendar year, but the 
Comptroller, in the exercise of his 
discretion, may waive one such 
examination or cause such examinations 
to be made more frequently if considered 
necessary. . . The examiner making the 
examination of any national bank shall 
have power to make a thorough 
examination of all the affairs of the 
bank and in doing so he shall have power 
to administer oaths and to examine any 
of the officers and agents thereof under 
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oath and shall make a full and detailed 
report of the condition of said bank to 
the Comptroller of the Currency. . . . 
The examiner making the examination 
of a national bank shall have power to 
make a thorough examination of all the 
affairs of the affiliate, and in doing 
so he shall have power to administer 
oaths and to examine any of the 
officers, directors, employees, and 
agents thereof under oath and to make a 
report of his findings to the 
Comptroller of the Currency. . . . 
28 U.S.C. 2680 (Federal Tort Claims Act): 
The provision of this chapter and 
section 1346(b) of this title shall not 
apply to— 
(a) Any claim based upon an act or 
omission of an employee of the 
Government, exercising due care, in the 
execution of a statute or regulation, 
whether or not such statute or 
regulation be valid, or based upon the 
exercise or performance or the failure 
to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function or duty on the part of a 
federal agency or an employee of the 
Government, whether or not the 
discretion involved be abused. 
. . . 
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, 
battery, false imprisonment, false 
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of 
process, libel, slander, 
misrepresentation, deceit, or 
interference with contract rights. . . . 
3. Other states 
California Government Coder section 818«6: 
A public entity is not liable for 
injury caused by its failure to make an 
inspection, or by reason of making an 
inadequate or negligent inspection, of 
any property, other than its property 
(as defined in subdivision (c) of 
Section 830), for the purpose of 
determining whether the property 
complies with or violates any enactment 
or contains or constitutes a hazard to 
health or safety. 
Montana Constitution, article II, section 162 
Courts of justice shall be open to 
every person, and speedy remedy afforded 
for every injury of person, property, or 
character. No person shall be deprived 
of this full legal redress for injury 
incurred in employment for which another 
person may be liable except as to fellow 
employees and his immediate employer who 
hired him if such immediate employer 
provides coverage under the Workman's 
Compensation Laws of this state. Right 
and justice shall be administered 
without sale, denial, or delay. 
APPENDIX C 
Excerpts from Proceedings of the 36th Session of the Utah 
Legislature, House of Representatives, Day 32 (Feb* 11, 1965), 
Disc. 1, Side 2, on file with the Clerk, Utah House of 
Representatives: 
SENATOR WELCH: 
This is a matter which needs some explanation, and 
that's why I'm pleased to be before you to explain what went on 
and that frankly what has happened in three of our neighboring 
states. And this, ladies and gentlemen, is of importance and 
should be considered seriously by all of you, whether you are 
interested in the schools, whether you are interested in the 
county governments, the city governments, or in the State 
government. In the State of California, about two years ago, we 
judicially abolished governmental immunity in that State. Almost 
immediately, the State was flooded by lawsuits. This is so 
serious that the Governor had to call in a special session of the 
Legislature, and they established a moratorium for one year on 
suits. The Legislature then met and the special committee was 
set up somewhat similar to the one that we had, and that special 
committee came up and a bill was passed, a series of bills was 
passed, in California, in which they have followed a somewhat 
similar procedure to that which we follow. And that gentlemen 
and ladies is a matter of Mopen the doorway a little bit,11 and 
I'll explain to that just a little bit later on. 
REPRESENTATIVE LOVERIDGE: 
I would like Senator Welch to explain section 3 on page 
1 and 2 of the bill if he will please. 
SENATOR WELCH: 
Section 3 is just setting up governmental immunity. As 
I explained to you, what we did, we followed the California 
practice by setting up statutorily governmental immunity. We say 
there is immunity, except as we provide in this bill, and then we 
carve out of that certain exceptions, such as driving automobiles 
and doing this and that, whereby we can bring an action. This is 
to avoid multiplicity of suits, I can't quite explain what they 
might be, but all kinds of things which would be a bother and a 
hindrance to the governmental entities. So actually what this 
does is establish by statute the fact of governmental immunity, 
and that's all that does. 
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APPENDIX D 
Excerpts from Comments of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws on 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U.C.C.C.) 
Preface, (In their prefatory note to the 1968 final draft of the 
U.C.C.C. (the version adopted by Utah as U.C.A. title 70B), the 
Commissioners stated that the "basic assumptions" on which the 
Code was predicated include:) 
First, the successful American Way of 
permitting competition to determine 
prices of non-monopoly commodities and 
services should also be allowed to apply 
to the pricing of money and credit: 
• • • 
Fourth, for competition effectively to 
determine the pricing of money and 
credit requires: 
a. for credit grantors, relatively 
easy entry into the market to avoid 
monopoly? 
b. for knowledgeable and 
sophisticated credit recipients, 
eliminating or at least minimizing 
controls; 
c. For the protection of less 
knowledgeable and less sophisticated 
credit recipients: 
1. uniform disclosure of the costs 
and terms of credit . . . 
2. ceilings on the price of 
credit, restrictions on creditors' 
rights and remedies, and enhancements of 
debtors1 rights and remedies sufficient 
to prevent overreaching by creditors 
without unduly limiting the availability 
of credit; 
3. administrative powers and self-
executing judicial remedies ample to 
assure compliance with statutory 
requirement. . . . 
7 Uniform Laws Annotated, pp. 242-3 (emphasis added). 
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Comments to Utah Code Ann, 70B-3-5Q2; 
1. Supervised lenders may include 
supervised financial organizations. 
Section 1.301(17). Since supervised 
financial organizations are already 
subject to supervision by a state or 
federal official or agency, such 
organizations are not required to obtain 
a license under this Act from the 
Administrator but their powers may be 
limited by statutes other than this Act. 
Section 1.108. Other persons making 
supervised loans in this State or taking 
assignments of loans for collection or 
enforcement in this State must obtain a 
license from the Administrator. 
• • • 
3. Licenses need not be renewed 
annually; such a requirement would 
merely increase the administrative 
burdens of the Administrator and the 
licensee. This section requires a 
licensee to obtain only one license to 
operate one or more offices in the 
State. While the single license permits 
the licensee to locate offices wherever 
he chooses, he must annually notify the 
Administrator of the location of each 
office. Section 6.202. . . . 
Comments to Utah Code Ann, 7QB-3-5Q3: 
1. This section is intimately 
related to disclosure (Part 3 of Article 
2 and Part 3 of Article 3) and to 
maximum charges (Part 2 of Article 2 and 
Part 2 of Article 3). The purpose is to 
facilitate entry into the cash loan 
field so that the resultant rate 
competition fostered by disclosure will 
generally force rates below the 
permitted maximum charges. . . 
2. A secondary purpose is to 
reduce the likelihood of establishing 
localized monopolies in the granting of 
cash credit. . . • 
3. This section does not apply to 
supervised financial organizations. 
Their authority to open new offices at 
which the may receive deposits and make 
loans is found not in this Act but in 
the statutes otherwise governing those 
organizations. 
• . . (Emphasis added.) 
Comments to Utah Cofle Ann. 7QB-3-5Q5: 
1. This section seeks to give to 
the licensee wide discretion in the 
method of keeping records. No rigid 
requirements are imposed with respect to 
the method of record keeping. Instead, 
records are acceptable if kept in 
accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles, and if they 
enable the Administrator to determines 
whether the licensee is complying with 
the Act. Modern techniques frequently 
require that records be kept in one 
central placef which in the case of 
multi-state lenders may be outside the 
State. This section allows central 
record keeping and allows records to be 
kept anywhere so long as the 
Administrator is given free access to 
them. See Section 3.506(2). 
2. Licensees are required to file 
composite annual reports; information 
need not be given as to individual loan 
outlets. This allows the Administrator 
to compile statistics to aid him in his 
duties and to provide the Legislature 
with information necessary for a proper 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
Act. This section provides for 
confidential treatment by the 
Administrator of information contained 
in annual reports. The Administrator 
may not publish information concerning 
individual lenders; all information 
published must be in composite form. 
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Comment to Utah Code Ann. 70B-3-506: 
1. This section provides for 
periodic examinations of supervised 
lenders but there is no requirement of 
annual examinations. The Administrator 
may tailor his examination policy as he 
sees fit. . . Under Section 6.106 the 
Administrator has general authority to 
investigate any person who he has 
reasonable cause to believe has engaged 
in an act which is subject to action by 
the Administrator. . . . (Emphasis 
added.) 
Comment to Utah Code Ann. 70B-9-1Q2; 
This section provides automatic 
licensing under Article 3f Part 5, for 
all lenders previously licensed under 
the State's licensed lender statutes 
prior to the effective date. No 
application or administrative action is 
required and the formal license under 
the prior statute, which will be 
repealed, will be a license under Part 5 
of Article 3 
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